Prologue
The 1970 elections in East Pakistan and West
Pakistan resulted in a situation where Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Awami League won
167 of the 169 seats in East Pakistan, whereas Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) won
81 seats out of 138 in West Pakistan. In order to pressurize both the
parties, and to meet the constitutional deadline, Gen. Yahya convened the National Assembly at
Dhaka on 3 March 1971. As the deadline
approached, neither one of the two main political parties showed any
flexibility.
Although Mujib was supposed to be the next Prime Minister of Pakistan, Bhutto
was not ready to accept, and refused to sit in the National Assembly as
opposition party. General Yahya Khan
postponed the National Assembly session.
On
12 Jan. 1971, Gen. Yahya Khan held a decisive meeting with Sheikh Mujib. Sheikh Mujib was not prepared to concede any
ground and the President closed the meeting in disgust. He left Dhaka in some anger and went straight
to Larkana where he was Bhutto’s guest.
There they were joined by General Abdul Hamid Khan. During the next two days, momentous decisions
were taken about the fate of the country. A lot has been written about this meeting but
it is all guesswork. However, one thing
appeared to be reasonably certain: the trio appeared to have reached an
understanding about various issues.[1]
On denial from Gen. Yahya to convene the National Assembly
session, Mujib, in a public rally in Dhaka on March 7, 1971 called upon the
Bengalis to launch movement against the Pakistan regime. In this circumstance, Tikka was sent out to
put down the unrest swelling in East Pakistan. Tikka took over Eastern Command
on 7 March 1971 from Lt Gen. Sahabzada Yaqub Khan who resigned.
Tikka directed the brutal military crackdown (officially known as Operation Searchlight) on 25 March
1971, with the help of Major General Rao Farman Ali and other Army generals
that stunned the Bengalis with gross violence, atrocities and massive human
rights abuses.
Yakub’s
replacement was backed up by a continuous inflow of reinforcements for the
garrisons. President Yahya in a speech
on March 6 had given further provocation by blaming Sheikh Mujib for the crisis
and not even alluding to Bhutto. For
this reason it was believed by many that Mujib would use his public meeting of
March 7 to proclaim independence, since Yahya had shown no willingness to come
to terms with the consequences of his earlier decision. The army itself was put on full alert to go
into action on March 7 in the event of such a declaration.
“Mujib realized that
any such proclamation would invoke massive carnage on Bengalis, and was
reluctant to assume such a responsibility.
His decision to persevere with non-cooperation, thus leaving the door
open for a negotiated settlement within Pakistan was a compromise between the
counter-pressures of the street and army.” By the afternoon of March 7 he had
successfully contained these pressures and committed his party to negotiations
within the framework of Pakistan.”[2]
At
this stage, it is pertinent to mention that during Jan. and Feb. 1971 Gen.
Yahya had visualized the possibility of a military crackdown accompanied by the
suspension of all political activity. He therefore prepared a plan called
Operation Blitz, which was cleared with the headquarters of the Chief Martial
Law Administrator and a copy provided to General Headquarters. In essence Operation Blitz meant the
suspension of all political activity in the country and a reversion to Martial
Law rule.[3]
General Yaqub
Khan, the commander of East Command insisted that General Yahya must not postpone
the session of the National Assembly elected after the 1970 election. “All of a sudden, General Yaqub Khan was
bundled off as a student on the Imperial Defence College course. This clumsy
and unceremonious action was obviously taken to get him out of the way.”[4]
Gen. Niazi Replaces Gen. Yaqub Khan
General Niazi took the command of East
Pakistan, wearing a pistol holster on his web belt, became abusive and started raving. Breaking into Urdu, he said: Main iss haramzadi qaum ki
nasal badal doon ga. Yeh mujhe kiya samajhtey hain. (I will change
this illegitimate-born race; what they think of me). He threatened that he would let his soldiers
loose on their womenfolk. There was pin drop silence at these remarks. Next
morning, a Bengali officer Maj Mushtaq went into a bathroom at the Command
Headquarters and shot himself in the head.”[5]
Niazi also asked Raja (the author of the
book in reference) for phone numbers of his Bengali girlfriends: “Abhi tau mujhey Bengali girlfriends kay phone number day do.”
[6]
Now just give me phone numbers of your
Bengali girlfriends.
Hartal and boycott
Mujib’s house in the Dhnmandi area of Dhaka became the focal point of all
political activity, and the Awami League high command went into continuous
session there. Responsibilities were
delegated for all functions of the government including the public utility
services, banks, transportation, and the
information media. Even the buses and
railway trains were left at wayside stations where they were deserted by their
staff. The Dhaka airport staff also went on strike and disappeared. The unity of action and purpose demonstrated
by the entire province was surprisingly complete. The Martial Law
Administrator, at this stage, was left with no one to answer his commands,
except his troops. In fac, it seemed
obvious that on a clarion call from Sheikh Mujib, they would even take up arms
in his support.
Lt.
Gen. Yaqub Khan Resigns
Lt. Gen. Yaqub Khan felt that the President
should visit Dhaka in person at the earliest, and take decisions that only he
could take. Yaqub sent several messages, via telephone and in writing, but
President was not convinced that his presence would help. He wanted Yaqub and
his Eastern Command to do their best. During the ensuing few days, this
tug-of-war went on between the Commander Eastern Command and the President
through Lt. Gen. Peerzada, the President’s Principal Staff Officer. Yaqub
indicated to Peerzada that since the President’s visit did not materialize, he
was resigning from his post, and that the written resignation would be
communicated on the morning of 5 March.[7]
Sheikh
Mujib Speaks on 7 March
However,
with every passing day Awami League tightened its grip on the administration in
East Pakistan. All organs of the
government reported to Sheikh Mujib’s headquarters for instructions. Even Inspector General of Police had stopped
coming to Martial Law headquarters, but started reporting to Sheikh Mujib’s residence.
Sheikh Mujib had, in the meantime,
announced that he would address a public rally at the Ramna Race Course on 7
March 1971 at 4 p.m.
“While
the army was standing by in the cantonment, I listened directly to Sheikh
Mujib’s speech. His tone was
conciliatory and he merely repeated the four earlier demands of his 4 March
speech. Within a few minutes, the speech
was over. Before the recalcitrant
elements could raise a hue and cry, Sheikh Mujib had hurriedly left the
stage. In fact, the whole event was a
bit of an anti-climax, but I thanked Allah and heaved a sigh of relief. I had recorded, briefly, the points made by
Sheikh Mujib during his speech on 7 March.
It will be useful to reproduce them for the reader: (a) He called upon his followers not to do
anything that may precipitate an already explosive situation; (b) Together they
should seek the cooperation of the army for the maintenance of law and
order. If the army shot an innocent
people in future, he would be the first to declare them an army of occupation.
(c) Pakistan must remain united and he was not seeking political separation.
(d) An elected leader of the majority, he expected the President to consult him
in all major matters and decisions. (e) They had to do all they could for the
inter-wing hatred to die down. (f) They must request West Pakistan not to treat
them as a colony. (g) They must bring to the notice of the world press the
recent happenings in East Pakistan.[8]
Yahya and Bhutto Negotiate with Sheikh
Mujib
Tikka
Khan had settled down for barely a week when President Yahya arrived on 15
March. He called a conference the
evening he arrived. He was explained the
details of the prevailing situation. On
16 March, he went into negotiations with Sheikh Mujib. “At about 10 p.m., on 17 March, I received a
call from Tikka Khan asking Maj.Gen. Farman and me to go over to the Command
House to see him. We both went and found
that Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan was also present.
Tikka Khan informed us that the negotiations with Sheikh Mujib were not
proceeding well and the President, therefore, wanted us to be ready for
military action and to prepare a plan accordingly. No further verbal or written directions were
issued. On the morning of 18 March
1971, Farman and I assembled in my office to work on the plan. Short of time, we agreed on the broad details
of the plan. The President had his own
plan—to flee from Dhaka prior to the military action.”[9]
On 21 March Mr. Bhutto arrived with his party
advisers and lieutenants. We made arrangements to receive Bhutto, arranged for
his lodging at the Inter-Continental Hotel, and provided security for him
during his stay. Bhutto was thus able to
join the negotiations with Sheikh Mujib which reportedly failed. On failure of
negotiations, he returned to West
Pakistan safely.
Operation
Searchlight
The new plan, prepared by Farman and myself,
was named ‘Searchlight’. The troops were stationed in eight permanent and
temporary cantonments spread all over the province: Dhaka, Comilla, Chittagong,
Sylhet, Jessore, Rajshahi, Saidpur, and Rangpur. In addition,
2 East Bengal Regiment was based
in Joydebpur, a few miles outside Dhaka. As the crisis deepened, I felt
apprehensive about the East Bengal battalions which were part of each brigade.[10]
I was instructed to put Operation Searchlight
into action on the night between 25 and 26 March 1971. This was a momentous
decision and I was very sad for the country. I was left amazed at the
nonchalant way in which this decision was taken, almost light-heartedly. The President had apparently decided to dump
East Pakistan and let it go its own way.
He seemed to be concerned about his personal safety only. Therefore, he left Dhaka under some sort of a
cover plan at about 7 p.m. on 25 March, which fooled nobody except, probably,
himself.[11]
After disarming of almost all centers of the
East Pak. Rifles, elements of the East Bengal Regiment and the Reserve Police,
the Pakistan Army, in collusion with religious extremist Razakars of Al-Badr and Al-Shams, engaged in the systematic genocide and atrocities of Bengali civilians, particularly
nationalists, intellectuals, youth and religious minorities.[12]
and [13]
Neighboring India provided economic, military and diplomatic support to Bengali
nationalists, and the Bangladesh government-in-exile was set up in Calcutta. Mujib was
arrested and flown to West Pakistan. Most of the Awami League leaders fled and
set up a government-in-exile in Calcutta, declaring Bangladesh an independent
state. Internal resistance was mobilized by some Bengali units of the regular
army, notably by Major Zia ur-Rahman, who held out for
some days in Chittagong before the town's recapture by the Pakistan army. He
then retreated to the border and began to organize bands of guerrillas. A
different resistance was started by student militants, among whom Abdul Kader
Siddiqi with his followers, known as Kader Bahini, acquired a reputation for
ferocity and killings of non-Bengali
civil and razakars in collaboration of Muki Bahini.
The civil war created a widespread displacement
of civilians in East Pakistan and widespread violations of human rights –
carried out by the Pakistan Army with support from political and religious
militias, beginning with the start of Operation Searchlight on 25 March 1971. Independent researchers
put the toll at 300,000 to 500,000. A further eight to ten million people fled the country to
seek safety in India.[14]
A large section of the intellectual community of Bangladesh were murdered, mostly by the Al-Shams and Al-Badr forces, at the instruction of the Pakistani Army.[15] Just two days before the surrender, on 14 December 1971, Pakistan Army and Razakar militia (local collaborators) picked up at least 100 physicians, professors, writers and engineers in Dhaka, and murdered them, leaving the dead bodies in a mass grave.[16] There are many mass graves in Bangladesh, with an increasing number discovered throughout the proceeding years. The first night of war on Bengalis, which is documented in telegrams from the American Consulate in Dhaka to the United States State Department, saw indiscriminate killings of students of Dhaka University and other civilians.[17] Numerous women were tortured, raped and killed during the war; the exact numbers are not known and are a subject of debate. Bangladeshi sources cite a figure of 200,000 women raped, giving birth to thousands of war babies.[18]
A large section of the intellectual community of Bangladesh were murdered, mostly by the Al-Shams and Al-Badr forces, at the instruction of the Pakistani Army.[15] Just two days before the surrender, on 14 December 1971, Pakistan Army and Razakar militia (local collaborators) picked up at least 100 physicians, professors, writers and engineers in Dhaka, and murdered them, leaving the dead bodies in a mass grave.[16] There are many mass graves in Bangladesh, with an increasing number discovered throughout the proceeding years. The first night of war on Bengalis, which is documented in telegrams from the American Consulate in Dhaka to the United States State Department, saw indiscriminate killings of students of Dhaka University and other civilians.[17] Numerous women were tortured, raped and killed during the war; the exact numbers are not known and are a subject of debate. Bangladeshi sources cite a figure of 200,000 women raped, giving birth to thousands of war babies.[18]
India-Pakistan War
Wary of the growing involvement of India,
the Pakistan Air Force launched a pre-emptive strike on Indian
Air Force bases on 3 December 1971. The attack was intended
to neutralize the Indian
Air Force planes on the ground. The strike was seen by India as an
open act of unprovoked aggression. This marked the official start of the Indo-Pakistani War. Three Indian corps were involved in the liberation of
East Pakistan. They were supported by nearly three brigades of Mukti Bahini fighting alongside
them, and many more fighting irregularly. This was far superior to the
Pakistani army of three divisions. The Indians quickly overran the country,
selectively engaging or bypassing heavily defended strongholds. Pakistani
forces were unable to effectively counter the Indian attack, as they had been
deployed in small units around the border to counter guerrilla attacks by the
Mukti Bahini. Unable to
defend Dhaka, the Pakistanis surrendered on 16 December 1971.[19]
Surrender of Pak. Army
On 16 December 1971, Lt. Gen A.
A. K. Niazi, CO of Pakistan Army forces located in East Pakistan signed the Instrument of Surrender. Over 93,000 Pakistani troops surrendered to the Indian
forces, making it the largest surrender since World
War II. Bangladesh sought admission in the United Nation
with most voting in its favour, but China vetoed as Pakistan was its key ally. The United States, also a key ally of
Pakistan, was one of the last nations to accord Bangladesh recognition. To
ensure a smooth transition, the Simla Agreement was signed in 1972, between India and Pakistan. The treaty
ensured that Pakistan recognized the independence of Bangladesh in exchange for
the return of the Pakistani 93,000 PoWs.[20]
Hamoodur
Rahman Commisstion Report
The
Report of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission of Inquiry into the 1971 War as
Declassified by the Government of Pakistan is highly critical of the military leadership for strategic and
tactical errors and misjudgments and for its treatment of the Bengali
population. It also criticizes Bhutto’s
concept of two majorities, two constitutions and two parliaments in
Pakistan. It also notes that the Awami
League held a majority in the assembly with the power to impose a constitution
for Pakistan. The commission suggested that Yahya and his associates, such as
Tikka Khan, should be tried for illegal usurpation of power from Ayub Khan, but
no trials were held.
Some
excerpts from Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report are vital for our information
on the subject.
Chap.
4, Para 5; We have also touched upon the negotiations which Gen. Yahya Khan was
pretending to hold during this period with Sk. Mujibur Rahman on the one hand
and political leaders from West Pakistan on the other. Although he never
formally declared these negotiations to have failed, yet he secretly left Dacca
on the evening of the 25th of March 1971, leaving instructions behind for
military action to be initiated when his plane reached the Karachi area.
Chap
4, para 7. All the Senior Army Commanders who were concerned with the administration
of Martial Law in East Pakistan as well as the senior civil servants who were
inducted into the civil administration in East Pakistan, have expressed the
view that military action could not have been a substitute for a political
settlement. Most of these witnesses have stated that the most favourable time
for a political settlement was between the months of May and September, 1971,
during which a reasonable amount of normalcy had been restored and the
authority of the Government had been re-established at least in most of the
urban areas, if not throughout the countryside. However, no effort was
made during these months to start a political dialogue with the elected
representatives of the people of East Pakistan; instead fraudulent and useless
measures were adopted
8.
The use of excessive force during the military action and the conduct of some
of the officers and men of the Pakistan Army during the sweep operations had
only served to alienate the sympathies of the people of East Pakistan.
9.
Precious moments were thus wasted, during which the Indians mounted their
training programme for the Mukti Bahini and started guerrilla raids into
Pakistan territory.
34. Even more
painful than the military failures of Lt. Gen Niazi is the story of the abject
manner in which he agreed to sign the surrender document laying down arms to
the so-called joint-command of India and Mukti Bahini, to be present at the
Airport to receive the victorious Indian General Aurora, to present a guard of
honour to the Indian General, and then to participate in the public surrender
ceremony at the Race Course, to the everlasting shame of Pakistan and its Armed
forces. Even if he had been obliged to surrender, by force of
circumstances, it was not necessary for him to behave in this shameful manner
at every step of the process of surrender. The detailed accounts which
have been given before the commission by those who had the misfortune of
witnessing these events, leave no doubt that Lt. Gen. Niazi had suffered a
complete moral collapse during the closing phases of the war.
36.
While we have not specially condemned the performance of senior Officers other
than Lt. Gen. A.A..K. Niazi, Maj. Gen. Mohammad Jamshed, Maj. Gen. M. Rahim
Khan and some of the Brigadiers, we cannot help remarking that all the Senior
Officers stationed in East Pakistan immediately before and during the war of
1997 must be held collectively responsible for the failings and weaknesses
which led to the defeat of the Pakistan Army.
CHAP.
5: Para 3. There is consensus on the imperative need of bringing to book those
senior Army Commanders who have brought disgrace and defeat to Pakistan by
their subversion of the Constitution, usurpation of political power by criminal
conspiracy, their professional incompetence, culpable negligence and wilful
neglect in the performance of their duties and physical and moral cowardice in
abandoning the fight when they had the capability and resources to resist the
enemy. Firm and proper action would not only satisfy the nation's demand
for punishment where it is deserved, but would also ensure against any future
recurrence of the kind of shameful conduct displayed during the 1971 war.
We accordingly recommend that the following trials be undertaken without delay.
i)
That General Yahya Khan, General Abdul Hamid Khan, Lt. Gen. S.G.M.M. Pirzada,
Lt. Gen. Gul Hasan, Maj. Gen. Umar and Maj. Gen. Mitha should be publicly tried
for being party to a criminal conspiracy to illegally usurp power from F.M.
Mohammad Ayub Khan in power if necessary by the use of force.
Conclusion
The
recommendations of Hamoodur Rahman Commission remained confined to the pages and
did not see its implementation by the Governnment of Pakistan. This state of
affairs shows the bankruptcy of justice system as well as failure of the state
administration. The identical replay is
going on now in the left-over Pakistan by allowing free-hand to home and
foreign terrorists now spread from Waziristan to Karachi.
It
is my firm opinion that any reversal of the past events in East Pakistan would
have been much better than the uncertain situation we are beset now. Awami League’s six points were virtually
their legitimate demands for share in the assets and liabilities of Pakistan,
and it was, by no means, against any infringement of any benefits of West
Pakistan. They deserved for their rights
not only by virtue of the Pakistan Constitution only but also by virtue of
their being majority in population and winning majority seats in the Elections
of 1970, the only first and fair elections in Pakistan ever. The East Pakistan tragedy is an irreparable
tragedy. And I think this tragedy occurred simply due to a sick and
psychological trait of mind of West Pakistan Army along with the political icons of the time.
ISRAR
HASAN
16TH
DEC. 2013
[1] A Stranger in
My Own Country; Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Khadim Hussain Raja, Oxford Univ. Press,
2012; New York; p.41.
[2] Ibid. Maj. Gen. K. H. Raja, p.42.
[3] Ibid. Maj. Gen. K.H.Raja, p. 42.
[4] Khaled
Ahmed, ‘Genetic
engineering’ in East Pakistan, pub.
In The Express Tribune, July 7, 2012.
[7]
Ibid. Lt. Gen. KH Raja; p.57.
[8]
Ibid. Maj. Gen. KH Raja, p. 63.
[9]
Ibid. p.71.
[10]
Ibid. p. 78.
[11]
Ibid. p. 79.
[13] Bangladesh Genocide Archive | Collaborators and War Criminals. Genocidebangladesh.org.
Retrieved Dec. 16, 2013.
[14] Rummel, Rudolph J., "Statistics
of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900",
Chapter 8, Table 8.2
Pakistan Genocide in Bangladesh Estimates, Sources, and Calculations.
[15] Asadullah Khan “The loss continues to haunt us” in The Daily Star 14
[16] "125
Slain in Dacca Area, Believed Elite of Bengal". The New York Times (New York, NY, USA). 19 December 1971.
[17] Sajit Gandhi The Tilt:
The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971 National Security Archive
Electronic Briefing Book No. 79 16
December 2002.
[18] Menen, Aubrey (23 July 1972). "The Rapes of Bangladesh". The New York
Times.
Retrieved 10 November 2011.
[19]
En. Wikipedia, Chap. Bangladesh Liberation War.
[20]
En. Wikipedia, “Bangladesh Liberation War 1971”.
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