Preliminary
No
doubt, Pakistan is passing through chronic instability to its internal
contradictions and regional geopolitical factors. “The survival of Pakistan as a state today
does not depend on vested interests or the armed forces. Only a thorough social transformation by rule
of law and the institutionalization of democracy, together with the disbandment
of the mercenary army, could offer Pakistan a guaranteed future.”[1]
Pakistan's
history does offer plenty of examples of leaders inviting disaster by making
fundamentally wrong choices.
Consequently more extreme scenarios like civil war, the triumph of
Islamist radicalism, inviting and sharing military muscle, the return of
authoritarian regime, can never be ruled out. In the worst case, Pakistan would
simply come apart, spewing nuclear technology and terrorists in all directions.
What can be done to prevent such a disastrous outcome? How can the idea of
Pakistan be made to work? A number of key reforms are necessary.
First,
rulers must be forced to take seriously an enlightened approach to internal and
external issues. Pakistan has to seek accommodation
with India, soften its stance on Kashmir and now on Afghanistan, crack down on
Islamist terrorism at home, and begin to negotiate the revision of blasphemy
and anti-woman laws and seek to implement one justice system of the country
with the exclusion of Shari’a Court. The
issue of Kashmir should not take precedence over the national interests and
benefits that Pakistan can have with good relations with India. According Najam Sethi, the editor of an influential
Lahore weekly remarks, "the momentum of change is too slow and awkward and
unsure to constitute a critical and irreversible mass." Sethi emphasizes two especially critical areas
in which the lawmakers must do more: packing up the jihadists, which means
accepting that they are not the solution to the Kashmir issue, and reducing the
influence of Islamist parties by facilitating the rise of moderate mainstream
parties in local, provincial and federal elections.
Since
independence in 1947 Pakistan has cycled between civilian and military regimes
of an almost predictable duration with an almost predictable frequency. The
country has experienced now for the first time in 66 years a peaceful and
democratic transition of power from one civilian govt. to another in 2013. Anyhow
history is not destiny. Things can go
differently from state to state and country to country. Political and social phenomena
cannot be predicted as firmly as a scientific phenomenon of physics and
chemistry in a scientific lab. Self-defense is innate in every human and living
being, so it is with a nation and a country.
Like many other states, Pakistan too might take a future path quite
different from those appearing in local and western media. After all, today’s Pakistan is much more
better than its founding period. A glimpse into this precarious period will
follow in the coming paragraph.
Attempts were made at
the very creation of Pakistan to nip it in bud. At the time of partition,
British India had a cash balance of Rs.4 Arab (Rs.4 Billion). After a long fight and discussions it was
decided to give Pakistan share of Rs.75 Crore (Rs. 750 million). India stopped its hand after paying the first
installment of Rs.20 crore (Rs.200 million).
This was the only cash when Pakistan came into existence on 14th
Aug. 1947. From the very first day of
Pakistan formation, Bharat followed a course of non-cooperation to make the
state a failure. When Gandhiji forced
the Bharat government by his Meren-bert (fasting till deah) on 15th
Jan. 1948, to pay the full share, only then Pakistan became able to get its
remaining share of cash.[2]
One-third of military
hardware of British India was agreed by all concerned to give to Pakistan. All
the military depots and the seventeen Ordnance factories were located in Bharat
territory. When the then supreme commander of British India tried to hand over
the Pakistan’s share, Bharat raised a great opposition to this proposal and
denied that Pakistan had any share in military hardware. The British Supreme
Commander had to resign and Pakistan could not get its share of military
hardware until today.[3]
Why
the Pakistan army was never tamed by civilian rule points back to the internal
and external alarming conditions just at the birth of Pakistan. At the
outset Pakistan was in disarray situation, beset by multi-dimensional issues of
refugee-influx from India, an empty treasury, scarcity of manpower to run
governments in center and provinces, hostile attitude of India and Russia, security alert and skirmishes in the state of
Kashmir. Civilian system was never
regarded by Pakistan's citizens as just, appropriate, or authoritative. A sick, paralyzed and lunatic, wheel-chaired Ghulam
Mohammad, who could neither walk by himself, eat by himself and talk by himself in intelligable language without help of his secretary, a beautiful American-Swiss girl, was
made the third governor-general of Pakistan in Oct. 1951.
This was the first great conspiracy at the very outset of Pakistan. It was followed by another conspiracy by assassinating Liaquat
Ali Khan, the first prime minister of Pakistan in Rawalpindi in the same month of
Oct. 1951. No constitution of the country came in existence
until 1956 and that too was abrogated in 1958.
Lacking
any clear road-map of direction, the state quickly aligned with the powerful
landed class: the army leadership and the economic elite, who joined forces to
claim authority in a nation without cohesion. In subsequent years, the
government maintained the feudal structure of society and entered into a
manifestly exploitative relationship with Pakistan's poor eastern wing (which
became Bangladesh in 1971 after a short but bloody war). Even now, bonded labor
is common in almost all the four remaining provinces, and many peasants live in
conditions close to slavery. Politicians and lawmakers made no attempt at
reform, ignoring the hearts and minds of the masses in favor of emerging
bureaucrats, feudal lords and military janta pursuing quick power and financial
gains.
Pakistan’s
uncertain future is a widely shared cause of concern ever since it’s founding
as an independent state. While accepting
the partition plan on June 15, 1947, the Indian National Congress maintained
that “when present passions have subsided, India’s problems will be viewed in
their proper perspective and the false doctrine of two nations in India will be
discredited and discarded by all.”[4] Sardar Patel (one of the top leaders of the Congress
Party of India) was convinced that “the new state of Pakistan was not viable
and could not last. . . . Pakistan would collapse in a short time.”[5]
The current generations do not have any
conception of the founding period. The
founding period of Pakistan presents a bleak picture. Soon after the death of Quaid-e-Azam in 1948,
and assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, in Oct.1951, Pakistan was played as a
ping-pong ball in the hands of civil and military players. The ping pong game, that started from 1951,
continued till August 2008, when Gen. Musharraf
resigned and departed. The
players included Chaudhary Ghulam Mohammed, Retd. Maj.Gen. Iskander Mirza, Gneral Ayub
Khan, Gen. Yahya Khan, I.I. Chundrigar, Sir Feroz Khan Noon, Nurul Amin, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, General Zia-ul Haq, Ghulam
Ishaq Khan, Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif,
and General Pervez Musharraf. The players, divided in two groups, played
the game some time to win the parliamentary democracy and some time to win for
the Martial law. In less than two years, Iskander Mirza had dismissed four elected prime
ministers, and was increasingly in great pressure for calling for new elections
in 1958.
Compare the situation now in 2013, after
peaceful and democratic transfer of power after five years of PPP government to
PML(N) government. This is Nawaz
Sharif’s third term of premiership, the two being, Nov. 1990 to July 1993 and from Feb. 1997 to Oct. 1999. Where we stand today
after a lapse of 66 years of Pakistan’s topsi-turvi past is certainly not upto
satisfaction. Every new regime starts
with good promises and good hopes, but all hopes and promises are shattered
with passing time. Pakistan is having
the same faces of lawmakers in both the houses since the 1990’s.
The real test of Sharif’s allegiance to
democratic norms will not just be how he handles the military, but how he deals
with his opponents in the PPP, the PTI, the MQM, the Baloch nationalists and
the religious fundamentalist’s parties. How he deals with the media will be
another test. After all, his last government is known for trying to muzzle
criticism, intimidate journalists, and widespread corruption. Sharif’s biggest challenges are likely to be
closer to home— fixing the shattered economy, ending an appalling energy
crisis, coping with poverty, tackling the home-grown Taliban insurgency, nationalist insurgency
in Baluchistan, and, above all, international and domestic terrorism, including
the ongoing pogroms against Pakistan’s Shia and other minorities by Sunni
militant groups. The state is beset by ethnic
tensions, sectarian violence, and deep divisions over the role of Islam in
society.
Sharif’s past has not been a clean slate. As Chief Minister Punjab, 1985 – 1990, Nawaz Sharif presided over the
liquidation/ privatization of several units of Punjab Industrial and
Development Board (PIDB). How and on
what prices these units were sold is still a secret but according to Company
Review in the daily DAWN in May 1991, Pasrur Sugar Mills was sold to United
Sugar Mills of United group for a “token price of Rupee one only". Samundri Sugar Mills was sold to
Monoos and Rahwali Sugar to a Muslim League politician Sheikh Mansoor. The
recklessness and favoritism shown in privatization of the PIDB units by Chief
Minister Nawaz Sharif was the hallmark of his privatization.[6]
Corruption
in privatization under Benazir and Nawaz Sharif governments during 1990-99 has
made legends. Volumes can be written about corruption in their privatization
simply by compiling the charges that they have traded with each other. It would
appear that not a single deal of privatization during the referenced nine years
has been free from corruption. Yet the full story of corruption in
privatization has not been told.[7] When Nawaz was dismissed in April 18,1993,
the Dissolution Order listed "the lack of transparency in the process of
privatization and in the disposal of public/govt. properties" as one of
the grounds for his dismissal.[8]
Sharif was accused of evading federal tax on the
purchase of a helicopter worth U.S. $1 million. He failed to cite any
substantial evidence to the Court of his innocence. The Lahore High Court ordered
Sharif to pay a fine of US $400,000 on grounds of tax evasion in 1999, and was
sentenced to 14 years of imprisonment.[9] I remember, my family members and me lost our
sizeable amount of dollars from our dollar accounts in Pakistan when Nawaz
Sharif seized all dollar accounts within
Pakistan during one of his premierships.
Now in 2013, the real
test will start when Sharif will be dealing with the day-to-day affairs of the
government. It is not the same Pakistan
Sharif had left behind in 1999. Today’s Pakistan is equipped with a vibrant
media which is not ready to comprise its freedom even with a military dictator.
We can hope better, but the topsy-turvy history of this country is full of many
shattered hopes. For
Sharif, the third term of premiership would not be a smooth sailing because the
country at present is abound with insurmountable challenges of different kinds.
Among stiffest challenges are: energy crisis, faltering economy, home
terrorism, inside and outside security threats, drone attacks, corruption and
anarchy. Eradication of corruption and ensuring
good governance will not be easy tasks in the presence of a historically
stubborn and corrupt bureaucratic-establishment and the absence of any system
of national security, network of surveillance and rule of law. Neither the drone attacks on Pakistan soil will
cease nor the home terror from Karachi to North Waziristan seems to go away so
long Pakistan remains committed with the United States on War on Terror and so
long the in-house al-Qaeda and Taliban are committed to fight against the
United States. Pakistan’s thorny relation
with the United States, India, and Afghanistan in the forthcoming days will not
be an easy pill to swallow.
Pakistan
in Western media
Western media, print and digital, tv’s and
satellite technologies see Pakistan as failed state. Several analyses of Pakistan completed before,
anticipated the current crisis. Perhaps
the toughest was the view of a group of experts on Pakistan convened by the
National Intelligence Council (NIC) in 2000 as part of its projection of global
developments in the year 2015. The collective judgment of those experts was
that by 2025 the South Asian region’s strategic relations would be defined by
the growing gap between India and Pakistan and their seemingly irreducible
hostility. The experts were wary of the
possibility of small or large scale conflict.[10]
In
2004 a project by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
came to a cautiously optimistic conclusion about Pakistan.[11] The CSIS study suggests that to have any kind
of impact on Pakistan, the United States will have to increase the level of
attention and resources that it devotes to South Asia in general and to
Pakistan in particular.
“My
own study in 2004 concluded that Pakistan may have reached the point of no
return along several dimensions and that extreme scenarios were no longer
inconceivable. I gave the establishment
dominated systems a fifty-fifty chance of survival but specified no time line,
and I also set forth a number of indicators, all of which were blinking bright
red by 2006” says Stephen P. Cohen. [12]
Tariq Ali’s suggestion to reshape the
Pakistani society from top to bottom is also advocated by Islamic orthodox
believers and neoconservatives. They talk of controlling the state machinery to
transform the state and society along Islamic lines.[13]
Jonathan
Paris, an American analyst based in Great Britain, has written the most
comprehensive study in the prediction genre, Prospects for Pakistan, published in 2010.[14] Paris list of challenges contains no
surprises. They are : State fragmentation and loss of control over various
territories; insecurity and terrorism throughout Pakistan; the economy;
governance issues, including epidemic of corruption; civil-military issues; trends in Islamism; the
rise of Pashtoon and Baloch nationalism;
rise of Pakistani Taliban; relations with India, China and the United
States. In his summary evaluation, Paris
argues that the country will “muddle through” but he notes that the ‘unexpected
challenges’ are what make it so difficult to predict even next one to three
years in Pakistan.[15]
Another scenario by the Pakistan’s one of the
most distinguished retired generals, was shown at a 2009 Canadian conference on
Pakistan’s future.[16] Lieutenant General Talat Masood, a former
secretary in the Ministry of Defense, posited three scenarios—best-case,
worst-case, and nuanced—but provided no probability estimate.[17]
Pervez
Hoodbhoy, one of Pakistan’s most thoughtful scholars, attempts a five-year
projection, warning of the consequences for the country if reform does not
happen quickly.[18] B. Raman, India’s leading Pakistan-watcher
and a former intelligence officer, concludes by arguing that India has a stake
in the survival of a moderate Pakistan.[19] Farzana Shaikh, a Pakistani scholar resident
in Great Britain, dismisses the rhetoric of
“country on the brink” or “failed state”
arguing that Pakistan’s problems stem from its very origins and that the
identity of Pakistan has never been clear nor has a consensus been developed on
the purpose of Pakistan.[20] Bruce Riedel, a former US intelligence analyst
with long contact with Pakistan, examines but does not predict an
Islamic-militant victory in Pakistan. He
points to Pakistan’s creation of and collusion with militant groups, which he
believes has left Islamabad vulnerable to an Islamic coup.[21] p/290.
R.Schmidt,
a US diplomat who served in Islamabad.
He traces Pakistan’s problems to its feudal political culture, in which
the wealthy refuse to tax themselves, the parties are arrayed around power
families, not ideas; and it matters little who governs, so deep is the decay in
Pakistani political institutions.[22] p/291
Hasan Abbas, a former Pakistani police
officer, now resident in the United States, offers a comprehensive assessment
of Pakistani’s multiple crises; he is
more optimistic than Riedel and others about a positive transformation. Noting
that Pakistan ranks ninth among 177 of the world’s weakest countries, he says
that “the challenges of militancy, weak governance, and economic insecurity are
feeding each other in a dangerous cycle, which must be broken if Pakistan is to
be saved.”[23]
Anatol Lieven expresses little doubt that
Pakistan will survive as a state and stresses the great strength of Pakistani
society, as opposed to the sometimes incompetent state. His views is one of the
most comprehensive overviews of Pakistan yet published. He warns against two
trends. One is environmental
degradation, as Pakistan will be hit worse than most if not taken care of its
environment. The other threat that would
lead to major changes in Pakistan would be a mutiny with the stable army in
case of a US (or joint Indian-US) incursion into Pakistani territory.[24] Maleeha Lodhi, a distinguished
diplomat-journalist, assembled a group of Pakistani scholars and former
officials who, in an edited volume present “to do” list that assumes that the
present extended crisis can be surmounted.[25]
Conclusion
While
agreeing to some and not agreeing to some, as shown in preceding paragraphs,
there are some truth in each one. I think, Pakistan is not a failed state, it
is a dysfunctional state. Its prevailing
social and political ills are self-infected. It is a troubled state that faces the threat
of going under, mainly due to internal problems and external pressures. By virtue of being a nuclear power, it has
neither deadly danger of extinction from India nor from the United States,
Russia or China. Its nuclear capabilities are a benefit and bane at the same
time—a benefit as a shield of enemy’s attack and a bane that it may fall in the
hands of home terrorists. However, it has the potential to overcome
those challenges and shape up as a reasonably functional state. It has a remarkable resilience of changing circumstances.
The danger and apprehension of secure and peaceful survival emanates from within
the current state of affairs in Pakistan.
However, the nature of current dangers is not as disappointing as it was
in its very inception in 1947 and next in 1971, when East Pakistan broke away
after Pakistan lost the India-Pakistan war.
Many analysts were not sure that present-day Pakistan could overcome the
shock of both military defeat and the loss of East Pakistan and survive as an
effectively functioning state. In the
midst of all those concerns, Pakistan managed to surmount the crisis of
confidence and put the country on a democratic and constitutional path.
Pakistan
is identified as one of the nine pivotal states facing serious internal threats
and external challenges. It could go
either way—succeed in coping with its challenges or fail. In either case, developments in Pakistan have
implications beyond its borders, adjoining Kashmir, India and Afghanistan. [26] However, the possibility of its decline or
fragmentation or emerging as a functioning democracy with a middle-level economy
depend on its internal determination to address the issues and international
support to meet the challenges. At the
present state of affairs, Pakistan seems trying to overcome its current
troubled situations, especially national security from home terrorism, economy
and energy crises. Only firm
determination of central and provincial government’s lawmakers, all
party-leaders with cooperation and sacrifices of the people of the four
provinces can change the dwindling condition of Pakistan.
Israr
Hasan
14th
August, 2013.
[1] Tariq Ali, Can
Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State, Middlesex UK, Penguin Books, 1983 pp/9-10.
[2]
Qudratullah Shahab, “Shahab Nama” An Autobiography in Urdu, Sang-e-Meel
Publications, 1987; p.301; (Urdu version
translated by the author of this article).
[3]
Ibid. p.302.
[4] K.
Sarwar Hasan, The Transfer of Power; (Pakistan Institute of International
Affairs, Karachi, 1966), p.261.
[5]
Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom (Orient
Longmans, Calcutta, 1959), p.207.
[6]
Shahidur Rahman, “Who Owns Paistan”, p.
42
[7]
Ibid. p. 38
[8]
Ibid.p.44
[9] BBC,
World (South Asia) (22 June 2000). "Sharif convicted of corruption".
BBC.
[10]
National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future
with Nongovernment Experts, NIC 2000-2001; Dec. 2000; pp/64-following.
[11]
Teresita C. Schaffer, Pakistan’s Futue and US Policy Options (Washington: CSIS
Press, 2004).
[12] Stephen P. Cohen, The Future of Pakistan. Brookings Institution Press, Washington,
D.C., 2011, p. 287.
[13]
Tariq Ali’s Pakistan: Military Rule or
People’s Power; New York, William Morrow, 1970,
[14]
Jonathan Paris, Prospects for Pakistan (London: Legatum Institute, 2010) pp.243-44.
[15]
S. P. Cohen, Ibid. p.288.
[16]
Johannes Baune, Pakistan’s Security: Today and Tomorrow (Ottawa: CSIS, Apr.
2004).
[17]
Ibid.
[18]
Perves Hoodbhoy, “Whither Pakistan? A
Five-year Forecast,” appreared in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 3, 2009.
[19]
B. Raman, “Pakistan: Quo Vadis?” in his
blog, “Ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.com”.
[20]
Farzana Sheikh, “Making Sense of Pakistan”
London, Hirst, 2009.
[21][21]
Bruce Riedel, “Armageddon in Islamabad,”
(National Interest, June 23, 2009); nationalinterest.org/printerfriendly.
[22][22]
John R. Schmidt, “The Unraveling of Pakistan”, in Survival: Global Politics and
Strategy, June-July 2009, Issue no. 3.
[23]
Hasan Abbas, “Pakistan Can Defy the Odds: How to Rescue a Failing State” Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (Clinton Township, Mich., May 2009 p/28.
[24]
Anatol Lieven, “Pakistan: A Hard Country”, (New York: Public Affairs Press,
2011).
[25]
Maleeha Lodhi, “Pakistan: Beyond the ‘Crisis State” (Colombia University Press,
2011).
[26]
Robert Chase, The Pivotal States: A New Framework for US Policy in the Developing
World ; (W.W.Norton, New York, 1999); pp. 1-11.
