Introduction
Pakistan represents one of the
world's most troubling states in crisis. It is home to an array of terrorist
groups (political, religious, sectarian, racial and ethnic) that pose threats
to international security and, increasingly, to Pakistan itself. It possesses a
nuclear arsenal of about ninety weapons that is rapidly growing, and in the
wake of growing instability, could become vulnerable to militants. Bordering a
conflict-ridden Afghanistan and poised on a seemingly war footing against India
at times, what happens inside Pakistan's borders matters deeply to the region
and the wider world.
In days after tomorrow, let’s hope
for good and prepare for the worst. Pakistan's
parliament has elected Nawaz Sharif as prime minister, marking a historic
transfer of power in a country that has undergone three military coups. Sharif received
244 votes in the 342-seat parliament, returning him to the prime minister's
office. Sharif's government will face a host of problems, including faltering
economic growth, worsening energy crisis, continued terrorism and bloodletting
inside country, religious and sectarian violence, relations with India, USA,
and Afghanistan. A country which
has spent almost half of its existence under some sort of direct military rule,
not without reasons, Sharif’s one of the challenges will be how to make his
relations with Pakistan military on democratic footings. Home issues are more
complex than external issues. Historically, several policy domains, including
that of foreign policy towards the US and India, Kashmir and Afghanistan and budget
allocations, etc. have been controlled by the Pakistani military. The civil-military divide can be said to be
the most fundamental fracture in Pakistan’s body politic.
Power Crisis
The new government faces all sorts of
challenges, but its most immediate task is to bring an end to crippling power
outages that are costing the nation billions of dollars in productivity. “The biggest challenge isn’t taming the many
militant groups that mount near daily attacks across the country. Our No.1
challenge is energy,” Khawaja Muhammad Asif, Pakistan’s new Minister for Water
and Power, tells TIME, June 25, 2013. Like many other
problems that afflict Pakistan, the energy crisis is a product of years of
steady neglect in a country of scarce resources, a growing population, and poor
management, a chain of corruption and street theft of power throughout the country.
While
its electricity bills grew bigger and bigger due
to use of pricy oil and gas for power generation, authorities failed to collect
defaulted payments. One of the biggest issues confronting the country right now
is a so-called circular debt of $5 billion. The importers of oil are owed money
by the companies that generate the electricity, which in turn are owed money by
the distribution companies, which are then owed cash by consumers who don’t pay
up, from the government and the private sector. In recent years, defaulters
have included the presidential palace, the Supreme Court, the top intelligence
agency and the Sharif family’s steel business.Another
constant problem is power theft. It starts off small, with the manipulation of
street meters. The government estimates that $2 billion is lost each year
through graft in the energy sector.
Terrorism
The top most challenge
the legislators is facing and expected to face in future is home militancy by
Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan) and other religious, ethnic and sectarian
extremists whose violence have
killed thousands in the past
and even now killing almost every day in
more than one or other urban cities of
Pakistan. No inside developments in power outage, economic progress or foreign
investments are possible so long this menace of terrorism persists.
Terrorism in Pakistan has become a major and highly destructive
phenomenon in recent years. The annual death toll from terrorist attacks has
risen from 164 in 2003 to 3318 in 2009, with a total of 35,000
Pakistanis killed between September 11, 2001 and May 2011.
President
Asif Ali Zardari,
along with former Pakistan Army chief Pervez Musharraf, have admitted that terrorist outfits were
"deliberately created and nurtured" by the past governments as a
policy to achieve some short-term tactical objectives. It is believed that almost all terrorist
groups are having the blessings of one political party or the other. Terrorists caught, sentenced and put to
death-roll are mysteriously released
after few days on bail secretly. Nobody knows who, when, and why.
The trend of terrorism began with Muhammad
Zia-ul-Haq's controversial "Islamization" policies of the 1980s, under which conflicts were
started against soviet involvement in Afghanistan. Zia's tenure as president
saw Pakistan's involvement in the Soviet-Afghan
War, a good time to cash the opportunity, which led
to a greater influx of ideologically driven mujahideen to the tribal
areas and increased availability of guns and drugs from the Golden Crescent.
The state and its Inter-Services Intelligence,
in alliance with the CIA, encouraged the "mujahideen" to fight a proxy war against Soviet forces present in Afghanistan. Most of the
mujahideen were never disarmed after the soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and
some of these groups were later activated at the behest of Pakistan in the form
of Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and others like the Tehrik-i-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) for their insurgencies in Indian held Kashmir. The
same groups are now taking on the state itself, making the biggest threat to
Pakistan and the citizens of Pakistan through the politically motivated killing
of civilians and security forces.
Terrorism
in Pakistan originated with ISI supporting terrorists in Indian Kashmir, the Soviet war in Afghanistan, and the subsequent civil war that is continuing since the
last decade. The conflict brought numerous fighters from all over the world to South Asia in the name of jihad. The mujahideen fighters were trained
by Pakistan's military, American CIA and other western intelligence agencies
carried out insurgent activities inside Afghanistan even after the war
officially ended.
At the end of the Soviet war in Afghanistan, between 1990 and 1996, the Pakistani
establishment continued to organize, support and nurture mujahideen
groups on the premise that they could be used for proxy warfare in the Indian
state of Jammu and Kashmir and in support of the doctrine of "strategic
depth" in Afghanistan through the use of the Taliban.
The post-9/11 War on Terrorism in Pakistan has had two principal elements: the government's battle
with jihadi groups banned after the attacks in New York, and the U.S. pursuit
of Al-Qaeda, usually in co-operation with Pakistani forces. In 2004, the Pakistani army launched a
pursuit of Al-Qaeda members in the mountainous area of Waziristan on the Afghan border, although skeptics question the sincerity of this
pursuit. Clashes there erupted into a low-level conflict with Islamic militants
and local tribesmen, sparking the Waziristan
War. A short-lived truce known as the Waziristan accord was brokered in September 2006, which indicated Pakistan's
reluctance to fight Islamic militia.
Pakistan
Taliban
How the
movement of Afghan Taliban extended in Pakistan Taliban goes in the past when
the United States uprooted the Taliban Regime in Afghanistan, hunting Taliban
thru. drone strikes inside Pakistan, and when NATO got permission of Pak. Govt.
for its containers supply to Afghanistan passing thru. Pakistan.
The transition from being Taliban supporters and sympathizers to
becoming a mainstream Taliban force in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) initiated when many small militant groups operating independently inside
Pakistan started networking with one another. This sequence of developments
occurred while Pakistani forces were spending the majority of their resources
finding "foreigners" in the area linked to al-Qa`ida and Taliban.
Soon, many other local extremist groups, which were banned in Pakistan, started
joining the Taliban ranks in FATA — some as followers while others as partners.
One cannot understand the deep depth of terrorism in Pakistan without
knowing the episode of Lal Masjid. It contributed in the rise of Pakistan
Taliban and strengthened the hands of al-Qaeda within Pakistan. The Lal Masjid was founded by Maulana Qari Abdullah in
1965. It was frequented by leaders of the Pakistani military and government. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, then
the Army Chief of Staff who later
became president in 1977, was a
close associate of Qari Abdullah.
The mosque is located near the
headquarters of Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI), and several staff members
were visiting the mosque for
prayers.
After Qari Abdullah was
assassinated at the mosque in 1998, his two sons, Maulana
Abdul Aziz and Abdul Rashid Ghazi, assumed responsibility for the entire complex situated in
Islamabad, inclusive of the mosque and the madrasah
Jamia Hafsa, the largest madrasah for women in Pakistan. The
brothers admitted to having regular communication with many of the wanted
leaders of al-Qaeda, including Osama
bin Laden.
Following the 9/11 attacks on the United States,
President Pervez Musharraf announced his support for the U.S.-led War
on Terror. This declaration sparked conflict with the
Lal Masjid, whose leadership was openly pro-Taliban. Maulana Abdul Aziz and Abdul Rashid Ghazi denied having any
links to banned terrorist organizations but were vehemently opposed to the War
on Terror and the conflict in Afghanistan. They openly condemned Musharraf and
opposed Pakistani security forces. The mosque became a source for speeches
calling for Jihad and assassination of Musharraf. This organization supported the imposition of Shari’a in Pakistan and openly called for the overthrow of the
Pakistani government. Lal Masjid
militants set fire to the Ministry of Environment building and attacked the Army
Rangers who guarded it, the military responded and put siege
of the Lal Masjid complex. The complex was besieged from July 3 to July 11,
2007, while negotiations were attempted between the militants and the state's Shujaat
Hussain and Ijaz-ul-Haq.
Once negotiations failed, the complex was stormed and captured by the Pakistan
Army's Special
Service Group. The conflict resulted in 154 deaths,
and 50 militants were captured. The assault resulted in pro-Taliban rebels along the Afghanistan border nullifying a
10-month-old peace agreement with the Pakistani Government.
This event triggered the Third
Waziristan War, which marked another surge in
militancy and violence in Pakistan and has resulted in more than 3,000 casualties.
Pakistani intelligence officials said they found letters from Ayman
al-Zawahiri, the second in command of al-Qaeda, after taking control of Lal Masjid. The letter directed the brothers and
militants to conduct an armed revolt. Government sources believe that as many
as 18 foreign fighters from Uzbekistan, Egypt, and Afghanistan had arrived weeks before the final
confrontation. Al-Zawahiri, issued a
videotape on July 11, 2007, calling Pakistanis to join jihad in revenge for the attack by the
Pakistan's Army on the mosque. Al-Zawahri's four-minute address was
titled The Aggression against
Lal Masjid and dedicated
solely to the clash between the Lal Masjid militants and the Pakistan Army. The
video was released by al-Qaeda's media wing, as-Sahab and was subtitled in English.
During this process, the Pakistani
Taliban never really merged into the organizational structure of the Afghan
Taliban under Mullah Omar; instead, they developed a distinct identity. From
their perspective, they intelligently created a space for themselves in
Pakistan by engaging in military attacks while at other times cutting deals
with the Pakistani government to establish their autonomy in the area. They
were accepted as a legitimate voice in at least two FATA agencies — South
Waziristan and North Waziristan. During this process, the Pakistani Taliban
effectively established themselves as an alternative leadership to the
traditional tribal elders. By the time the Pakistani government realized the
changing dynamics and tried to revive the tribal jirga institution, it was too late. The Taliban had killed
approximately 200 of the tribal elders under charges of being Pakistani and
American spies. They killed Benazir
Bhutto in Dec. 2007 in the Liaquat Bagh, Rawalpindi, when she came back to
Pakistan to contest the forthcoming elections and they have vowed to kill
Musharraf.
By 1998, Pakistani Taliban groups
were banning TV and videos in towns along the Pashtun belt, imposing Shari’a
punishments such as stoning and amputation in defiance of the legal system,
killing Pakistani Shia and forcing people, particularly women to adapt to the
Taliban dress code and way of life. Pakistani leaders, then, appeared to be
oblivious of the challenges and Sunni fundamentalists continued to support the
Taliban.
The Taliban and their supporters
present the Muslim world and the West with a new style of Islamic extremism,
which rejects all accommodation with Muslim moderation and the West. They
rejected any talk or understanding with the present government of Nawaz Sharif
after their leader, Waliur Rehman, was killed in drone strike on 29 May 2013. Despite Mr. Sharif’s repeated calls to
Americans to stop drone strikes in Pakistan territories, the strikes continue
chasing and killing al-Qaeda and Taliban perpetrators. Civilian casualties are one of the common
features of such strikes, because al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders usually pick
their hideouts in civilian population.
Pakistan Taliban retaliates against drone strikes by killing soft
civilian and non-civilian targets in populated cities of Pakistan. The bloody
triangle of America, Pakistan and Taliban seems insoluble so long drone strikes
continue and so long the home-grown Taliban and al-Qaida members are
dagger-drawn with the United States within the boundary of Pakistan. The situation might change after the United
States completely withdraw from Afghanistan next year.
Drone
Strikes
Dealing
with the United States could be in some ways a trickier matter. While
officially a U.S.-ally in the fight against terrorists, Pakistanis have long
been at odds with the U.S. on some of its tactics, especially drone strikes on
Pakistani soil. The most recent drone strike came Wednesday, May 29, 2013 and
the Pakistani Taliban militant group said it killed their deputy leader, Waliur
Rehman. Cessation of drone attacks on Pakistan soil
will not be an easy task for Nawaz Sharif so long Pakistan remains committed
with the United States on War on Terror and so long the in-house al-Qaeda and
Taliban are committed to fight against the United States and NATO. The United
States and Al-Qaeda are deadly enemy to each other; America after 9/11 and
Taliban and al-Qaeda, after ousting them from their regime of Afghanistan.
Afghanistan and Pakistan are the breeding grounds of Al-Qaida and Taliban. After unprecedented 9/11 attacks within
American soil, the US administration thinks that their country is insecure so
long Al-Qaeda and Taliban hide in Afghanistan and Pakistan. There might be some adjustment between the US
and Pakistan on this issue. But there is remote chance that Pakistan can get
rid of Drone strikes totally. If
Pakistan declares it is no more a partner in the Fight for Terrorism, not only it
will lose all the asheerbad
(privileges) of the United States and its allies, but it will have enhanced
possibility of attack on its nuclear installation.
A brief of what went between Pakistan and the United States
on the second day of 9/11 will show the intensity of the endangered relation
between Pakistan and the United States. A day after Sept. 11, Deputy
Secretary of State, Richard Armitage summoned Gen. Mehmood Ahmad, director
General of Pakistan Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) to his office and
informed him that President Bush was going to make a TV address delivering a
blunt message to the world, “Either you are with us or you are with the
terrorists.” Armitage asked Mehmood,
“where would Pakistan stand?” Mehmood replied without hesitation that “we have
always been with you.”
Gen. Mehmood was then in Washington, a
few days before 9/11 as a guest of CIA director George Tenet for talks with US
lawmakers.
On Sept. 13,
Armitage, handed a one-page list of
seven US demands to Gen. Mehmood and said the demands were non-negotiable.
Mehmood promptly replied that Pakistan would do whatever the Americans asked of
it. Secretary of State Colin Powell spoke to Musharraf on telephone, telling
him that he expected an early reply on the US demands. The same day a cabinet
meeting in Washington concluded that if Pakistan denies “it would be at risk of
attack.” One of the stipulations of the
US demands asked Pakistan “to stop al-Qaeda operatives on the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border and intercept all arms shipments through Pakistan
while ending all logistical support for bin Laden”.
Today we know that not only
al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives are vigilant in safe refuge of Waziristan, Wana
and many other sporadic places in FATA, but Osama bin Laden had been living
secretly in Abbottabad within close proximity of Pakistan military
establishment for the last ten years. In the circumstances now prevailing, it
seems Pakistan has no option in safeguarding its safety and sovereignty from
drone attacks.
Sectarian Violence
One of the onerous tasks before
this and its successor’s regime is how to tackle the sectarian violence. This menace was spread by Ziaul Haq, Nawaz
Sharif’s mentor, who gave Pakistan a Blasphemy Law and a Shari’a Court and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, an irreligious man,
who became a champion of Muslim and Islam by constitutionally declaring Ahmedis
as non-Muslim. This menace was embedded in Pakistan since its creation. It can be subsided by legal and security
measures of the law makers, but cannot be totally eradicated. Pakistan has to
live with this violence so long its Constitution is not amended from Islamic
Republic of Pakistan to Democratic Republic of Pakistan. Declaring Pakistan to be a democratic republic
will not alter the characteristics of Pakistan nation which is inherently
Islamic and Muslim. Secular Pakistan will stop the opportunists, like Zia and
Bhutto, to use their dogma and doctrines in the state affairs and getting their
personal agenda fulfilled.
Shi'a in Pakistan makes up 6% of the
total Muslim population, while the remaining 94% are Sunnis. In the last three decades, as many as 9,000
people are estimated to have killed in sectarian fighting only in Pakistan.
Among those blamed for the sectarian violence in the country are mainly Sunni
militants such as Sipah Sahaba,
Jaish-e-Muhammadi, Jamaat-e-Islami, al
Qaeda and its affiliated Pakistani
Taliban and Punjabi Taliban . However, predominant Sunni terrorist groups are
often blamed for frequent attacks on minority Shias, Ahmadis, and Christians on their religious
gatherings resulting in reprisal attacks by them.
Salmaan
Taseer (1944-2011) , the Governor of Punjab, was gunned down by his own
bodyguard on Jan. 4, 2011 in Islamabad, only because of his opposition of
Pakistan Blasphemy Law.
Also the many bomb blasts in the sectarian mosques and mausoleums in Pakistan
are expression of sunni’s hate against shi’a and vice versa. Christians and other minorities are also
victims of sectarian hate.
In
the 1990s and 2000s, sporadic violence resulted from disputes over control of
Pakistani mosques between Barelwi and Deobandi.
In May 2001, sectarian riots broke out after
Barelvi leader, Saleem Qadri, was assassinated by the
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, a
Deoband-affiliated terrorist group.
In April 2006 in Karachi, a bomb attack on a
Barelvi gathering to celebrate the Mawlud (Prophet’s birthday) killed at least 57 people.
On February 27, 2010, Barelvis
celebrating Mawlud in Faisalabad and Dera Ismail Khan were attacked by
militants believed to be affiliated with the Taliban and Sipah-e-Sahaba, again sparking tensions
among the rival sects.
The blasphemy laws have been used in many unscrupulous ways to harass
minority communities such as the Ahmadis and shias who are subject to onerous
sentences and restrictions under the law.
In addition to it, an exhaustive list of violations in Pakistan, apart
from Blasphemy, relates to Universal Human Rights, child abuses, intolerance and persecution of minorities, woman’s
persecution under Hudood Ordinance, and ethnic, sectarian, civil and religious
blood-lettings and killings throughout Pakistan.
Economy
in Crisis
Due to inflation and economic crisis worldwide during 2008
onward, Pakistan's economy reached a state of Balance of Payment crisis.
"The International Monetary Fund bailed out Pakistan in November 2008 to
avert a balance of payments crisis and in July last year increased the loan to
$11.3 billion from an initial $7.6 billion."
Since the beginning of 2008, Pakistan's economic outlook has
taken stagnation. Security concerns stemming from the nation's role in the War on Terror have created
great instability and led to a decline in FDI.
Concurrently, the insurgency has forced massive capital flight from Pakistan to the Gulf. Combined with high global
commodity prices, the dual impact has shocked Pakistan's economy, with gaping
trade deficits, high inflation and a crash in the value of the Rupee, which has
fallen from 60–1 USD to about 100-1 USD in a few months.
On April 12, 2013, reserves of the State Bank stood at $6.64bn,
and these were much lower than the reserves held by the central bank in
2001-2002. The downfall in 2002 was due to the sanctions imposed on Pakistan
for its nuclear test. Today the reserves are depleting fast and the burden of IMF
repayments is too large as against the size of the reserves.
There is recognition amongst economists that
the economy has not been managed well under the PPP government. Much of the
criticism that has appeared in the press over the last few years is warranted.
The absence of an economic plan or vision is the highlight of the economic team
in Islamabad. The fact that the team has changed so many times in less than
four years is also an indication of the confusion amongst political leaders and
the lack of priority given to the economic problems faced by Pakistanis. The
failure of PPP government and its economic team to address economic issues has
been much documented in the media and there is little disagreement over this
claim.
However, Pakistan economy is not in a crisis,
nor on the verge of collapse. It has serious problems and its crisis is a much
deeper affliction. Greece’s economy is in a crisis, Britain’s or America’s is
not. The latter two are struggling with high and growing unemployment, low
growth, high debt — just like Pakistan, but of course at a different level and
of a much different nature — but this is
not a crisis. Those who have been hammering the ‘collapse and crisis’ mantra
are not wrong in citing many of the statistics they do. The fiscal deficit is
high and growing, inflation seems to be stuck at around 14 per cent, investment
is low, poverty has grown over the last five years, and so on. Clearly, these
indicators reveal an economy which is performing poorly.
Pakistan had requested for $7.3 billion support
load from the IMF and an application is with the IMF board. They have agreed to
grant the loan amounting to $5.3bn. “We have also requested that the first
year’s tranche may amount to $3bn so that Pakistan may be able to repay the
installment of previous IMF dues without any serious implication on economy,”
Mr. Dar, the Finance Minister, said. “Our government is taking steps to further
the cause of microfinance in Pakistan,” he said, adding, “in this budget
(2013-14) we have announced Rs.3bn program for microfinance that would be based
on Qarz-i-Hasana and at least 50pc loans would be provided to women.”
Pakistan’s state bank currently has about $9
billion in foreign exchange, enough to cover about two months’ worth of
imports, if cash deposits in private dollar accounts are not counted. Pakistan
owes the IMF just over $6.2 billion out of an $11 billion loan package in 2008.
Pakistan is due to repay $1.6 billion in the first six months of 2013, a schedule
that will strain reserves and may accelerate the slide of the rupee currency.
The Pakistan government has failed to enact the
reforms needed to boost reserves and qualify for a new IMF program. The IMF
wants Pakistan to broaden its narrow tax base and slash subsidies that benefit
the wealthy. The IMF said further funding was contingent on a consensus being reached by political parties on
comprehensive, permanent financial reforms and firm implementation of them.
Growth is hindered by chronic power cuts that have been hurting key industries like textiles and cottage industries.
Mismanagement of the power sector costs an estimated $1.5 billion every year,
according to the Pakistan Planning Commission. The IMF said it wants Pakistan
to reduce its fiscal deficit by closing tax
loopholes and cutting expenditure like energy subsidies.
Launching the Economic Survey of 2012-13 on
Tuesday, June 11, the Minister hinted at a difficult road ahead, including a
gradual increase in electricity to bridge a gap between cost and its billing
and promised to eradicate Rs500 billion circular debt before June 30 or in two
months at worst. “Unless we do it, reduction in load-shedding is not possible,”
he said.
He said the revival of the economy was the top
priority of the new government and the next year’s growth target had been set
at 4.4 per cent. “We will be more aggressive to restore investment in the
infrastructure sector and hence the development programs had been pitched at
Rs1.155 trillion for the next year.”
He said the government would try to put as
little burden on people as possible, but there is a need to cover Rs2 trillion
deficits. He said the fiscal deficit would be brought down to 4.5pc of GDP in
the next three years from 8.5pc this year, The government expenses would also
be curtailed by 30pc to take the country forward, he added.
He said the energy sector was causing GDP loss
of about 2pc which was not allowing the industry and commercial activities to
flourish. The prime minister himself would be heading a cabinet committee on
energy to end non-recovery of bills for gradual reduction in load shedding.
Pakistan Military
Pakistan military is one of the home challenges for Pakistan
government. Military intervention
started as early as 1958, when Ayub Khan
announced martial law and suspended the parliament and the constitution.
According to a popular Pakistani joke, "all countries have armies, but
here, an army has a country."
Indeed, even when civilian governments have nominally been in charge in
Pakistan, there has never been much doubt about who actually makes decisions there.
In addition to holding political power at the plea of national security, the
Pakistani army controls vast commercial and industrial interests and owns massive
rural and urban properties.
The question of why the warrior class was
never tamed by civilian rule points back to the founding of the Pakistani
state. As the respected Pakistani scholar Eqbal Ahmad has emphasized, the
civilian system of power was never regarded by Pakistan's citizens as just,
appropriate, or authoritative. Some
seven years before the first military takeover in 1958, the political process
had slipped off the rails. After the
assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in Oct. 1951 a succession of unelected civil
bureaucrats assumed elective office.
Pakistan’s third governor-general, Ghulam Mohammad, was a hardened
bureaucrat who had no appetite for democratic practices. In Apri 1953 Ghulam
Mohammad in close concert with the military and bureaucratic establishment
dismissed the Bengali prime minister, Khawaja Nazimuddin, who enjoyed the
confidence of a majority in parliament and allotted the ministry to Mohammad
Ali Bogra. In Oct. 1954, Ghulam Mohammad
dismissed the first constituent assembly when it tried curbing some of his powers
and brought in a so-called ‘cabinet of talents’ remarkable only for its utterly
unrepresentative character.
The sorry state of Affairs and seeing an
utterly explosive public, Gen. Mohammad Ayub Khan, declared Martial Law in
1958. He handed his power to Yahya Khan,
who held the first national elections in 1971.
Awami League of East Pakistan, under the leadership of Sheikh Mujeebur
Rahman, came out winner of the Election, winning majority seats of the
parliament. Yahya Khan and Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto denied to hand over the succession of power to Awami League which,
consequently, resulted in the dismemberment of united Pakistan and creation of
a separate, sovereign state of Bangladesh in December, 1971.
Despite
Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s declaration of Independence in 1947, the
idea of Pakistan was unclear from the start. It had no Constitution and
parliament until 1956. No national elections were held before 1971. No constitutional government completed its
term, except the last one of PPP (2008-2013).
Lacking any clear basis for legitimacy or direction, the state quickly
aligned with the powerful landed class: the army leadership and the economic
elites. Corrupt bureaucracy joined hands with forces to claim authority in a
nation without definition or cohesion. In subsequent years, the government
maintained the feudal structure of society and entered into a manifestly
exploitative relationship with Pakistan's unprivileged eastern wing (which
became Bangladesh in 1971 after a short bloody war). Even now, bonded labor is common in the four
provinces of remaining Pakistan, and many peasants live in conditions close to
slavery. Politicians, with the exception of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, have made no
attempt at reform, ignoring the hearts and minds of the masses cultivating army
and feudal elites favor and pursuing quick financial gains.
The result has been ideological confusion, civilian
helplessness, and an environment, eminently hospitable to greedy and corrupt
politicians. Indeed, no elected government, excepting the PPP coalition from
2008-13, completed its term in Pakistan's 61-year history. Pakistani generals
express contempt for the civilian order and steadfastly hold that "what is
good for the army is good for Pakistan" and Pakistani society is thoroughly
militarized. It is even a criminal
offense to "criticize the armed forces of Pakistan or to bring them into
disaffection." When Nawaz Sharif, after
escalating the tug of war with the Armed Forces decided in 1999 to oust the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of Army Staff , he was deposed by General Pervez Musharraf, and martial
law was declared throughout the country.
“Pakistan military is the only component of
the wider "establishment" that runs Pakistan. This ‘establishment’ apparently
consists of an oligarchy comprised of
"an informal political system that ties together the senior ranks
of the military, the civil service, key members of the judiciary, the
bureaucracy, and landed elites." Members of this oligarchy have a common set
of beliefs: that India must be countered at every turn; that nuclear weapons
have endowed Pakistan with security and status; that the fight for Kashmir is
unfinished business; that large-scale social reforms such as land redistribution
are unacceptable; that the uneducated and illiterate masses deserve no respect;
that vociferous Muslim nationalism is not desirable; and that Washington is to
be despised but fully taken advantage of.
Underlying these "core principles," one might add a
willingness to serve power at any cost.
Whatever the cost Pakistan
paid to Pakistan Army it is not out rightly unjustified. No one can deny in view of the
inefficiencies, dishonesty, undemocratic practices and the loot of politicians
and their civil administrations from the very outset of Pakistan that the
military has proved to be the spine of Pakistan. No democracy can run and work in such a society
of poor literacy with a system of feudalism and corrupt politicians and
bureaucracy. Had Pakistan forces not taken the charge of the hopeless
situations in times of emergency, we should have been in more devastating
situation today. The prime job of Pakistan military today, I think, is to
strengthen the civil government of Nawaz Sharif within the limits of Pakistan
constitution, instead of taking benefits of the hopeless situation, as happened
in the past. Healthy survival of each is contingent upon the cooperation and
safeguard of the other.
ISRAR HASAN
10th July 2013
Bomb carnage at Karachi prayers, BBC Online, 11 April
2006